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Abstract
An agent want to buy products from e-market
often encounters unknown suppliers, he then must
choose between maximizing its expected utility
according to the known suppliers and trying to
learn more about the unknown suppliers, since this
may improve its future rewards. This issue is
known as the trade-off between exploitation and
exploration. In this research, we study the problem
of an agent how to select suppliers from electronic
markets with incomplete information. The agent
has no knowledge about suppliers, so he needs to
learn the information by consuming their product
and his object is to maximize total utility.
We consider two different scenarios. The first
is an agent selects a single supplier at each time
period. By the introduction of Gittins index, we
show that by using Gittins index technology, the
agent can achieve the optimal solution. The second
is an agent can select several suppliers at each time
period, we propose four heuristic policies and
evaluate them by building up a simulation tool.
Keywords: Business Intelligence; select suppliers;
incomplete information; multi-armed bandit
problem

1. Introduction
Nowadays, with the development of electronic
commerce such as B2B (Business to Business),
B2C (Business to customer) and C2C (Customer to
Customer), an agent which wants to buy products
or raw materials from electronic markets may find
there are hundreds of suppliers available. It on the
one hand provides many options for the agent,
however, on the other hand make the agent much
difficult to choose suppliers since the agent has no
quality knowledge of each supplier. The agent can
learn quality of product after using it, therefore the
agent will have prior knowledge of supplier when it
has experiences with the supplier. The prior
knowledge can be used by the agent to decide
which suppliers to choose next round. We consider
situations when the agent need to buy products
repeated from electronic markets and he prefers
product with high quality and the lowest price.
Product with high quality and lowest price ensures
the high utility of the agent. Since in our context,
agent is the representative of buyer, thus we abuse
these two words hereafter without explicit
explanation.
The issue of uncertainty quality can also happen in
traditional market, however, the situation is much

more prevail in electronic market since buyers
can’t see and touch the real product in advance.
The information which can help buyers to make
decision is pictures and description posted by
suppliers. However, since surveillance service is
still not good in electronic market, supplier with
low quality might provide better pictures and
description than supplier with high quality, thus
agent could be misled and make wrong choice.
Other factors such as larger number of suppliers,
unstable markets, delivery time and so on make the
uncertainty problem much more pronounced in
electronic markets than traditional markets [1, 2].
Consider an agent want to buy fish oil online, he
shall use fish oil as keyword and search it on
Google, as a result, Google will return a long
supplier list with different quality (condition,
delivery time and etc). Thus the agent must decide
which supplier to choose so as to maximize his
utility.
One may argue that buyer can choose supplier with
the highest price, since in common sense, high
price represents high quality. However, in
electronic market, price can’t use to identify quality,
since unknown supplier may exist, which provides
product with high quality, but charge low price. Of
course, there may suppliers sell product with low
quality and high price. Consider, continue the
above example, suppose dailyVita is the largest
online supplier of fish oil, but there are other online
suppliers sell the same fish oil as dailyVita with
discounted price and may also provide better
quality product, if quality can be measured as
delivery time or customer service. This may due to
other suppliers make deal with better delivery
company.
In situations where there are a lot of unknown
suppliers and unknown suppliers may sell product
with high quality and low price, buyers need to
employ intelligence policies in order to choose the
most profitable deals. We assume that past
information can be used as a gauge to measure the
quality of supplier. For example, if a buyer makes
several deals with supplier A and observes that the
mean quality of these deals is negative, thus he
might not choose supplier A again due to the
unhappy experience. However, on the other hand,
if the history experience with supplier A is positive,
buyer might choose supplier A again with high
probability. Thus the dilemma of the buyer is
whether to choose best known suppliers or try
unknown suppliers so as to learn the quality of
unknown supplier which may improve the future
benefit of the buyer. This dilemma is also known as
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the trade-off between exploitation and exploration.
The most pronounced problem of this dilemma is
multi-armed bandit problem (MAB) [3, 4]. MAB
problems are a class of sequential resource
allocation problems concerned with allocating on
or more resources among several alternative
projects. Such problems are paradigms of making
decisions that yield high current rewards, versus
making decisions that sacrifice current rewards
with the prospect of better future rewards. It can be
described as follows: suppose there is a machine
with several slots, each slot can generate a certain
amount of reward. Rewards are drawn from a
certain statistic distribution. A gambler can pull a
single slot at each round and receive the reward
generated by the slot. Since the gambler has no
knowledge such as mean value and variance of
each slot, he needs to learn the parameters by
pulling them. The problem is what sequence of the
slots gambler should pull so as to maximize his
total reward. One can easily find that the problem
faced by buyer is similar with the gambler if
suppliers can be treated as slots.
Rina and Sarit[5] consider the same problem
context as described above and apply Gittins Index
technology to choose supplier in the condition of
incomplete information. They show that how to
select supplier using Gittins Index in different
settings: consider the probability of the agent to
buy at each time period and different sizes of
purchases. However in their settings, they don’t
consider the risk attitude of buyers and the size of
suppliers. They assume that at each time period, the
agent can only choose a single supplier. Though the
assumption is reasonable and enables them to
employ Gittins Index, the true situation is that
buyer can choose any supplier at each round. Select
multiple suppliers at each time period can be
modeled as multi-armed bandit problem with
multiple plays (MABMP), but the solution of
MABMP remains unsolved. In this paper, we
extend the work of Rina and Sarit. We consider the
risk attitude of buyer as well as the size of supplier
buyer can choose.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we
discuss related work and, in Section3 we present
the formal model. We extend the model and discuss
how to consider the risk attitude of buyer in Section
4. Section 5 presents some heuristic algorithm for
multiple-supplier choosing problem. Finally, in
Section 6, we provide conclusions and suggestions
for future extensions.

2. Related Work
The issue of making decision with incomplete
information is widely studied. Eric[6] investigates
dynamic pricing strategies for maximizing revenue
in an internet retail channel by actively learning
customers’ demand response to price. Wang[7]
formulate the optimal pricing problem with a
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bandit model and characterize the solution by
means of stochastic dynamic programming. Cathy
and Parijat[8] also study the dynamic pricing issue
in e-Services, instead of using standard bandit
process they combines annealing algorithm with
Bayesian learning to balance the trade-off of
exploitation and exploration. Rina and Sarit[5] use
Gittins Index technology to select supplier in an
environment
of
incomplete
information.
Salganicoff and Ungar[9] use Gittins index to
select actions which optimally trade-off exploration
and exploitation, they combine Gittins indices with
decision trees to develop a mapping from state and
action to success or failure of that action. Pandey
and Olston[10] consider how a search engine
should select advertisements to display with search
results, they model advertisement placement as a
multi-armed bandit problem, their algorithms are
based on upper confidence bound[11] algorithm
which is mainly to solve non-stochastic
multi-armed bandit problem.
The traditional supplier choosing problem is
mainly about how to select a supplier among
several criteria: quality, delivery reliability, product
performance and unit price [12, 13]. Unlike in an
uncertainty setting, all criteria are known in
advance. However, as we show above, in the
environment of e-business, most of the criteria are
unknown which make the traditional supplier
selection tools ineffective. That’s why we need to
discuss the problem with incomplete information.
Generally, products are classified into three
different types: products with a quality ascertained
by buyer before a purchase; products with a quality
that is learned after the products have been bought;
products have a quality that can hardly be learned
even after consumption. In this paper, we assume
that products’ quality can be inferred after
consumption.
Since an agents in our context need to decide
between choosing best known suppliers or trying
other suppliers in order to learn the quality of their
products. The technologies for exploitation and
exploration trade-off are known as reinforcement
learning. The most used technologies are: the
dynamic programming approach [14] which is
expensive in time and space; the heuristic forward
iteration algorithms [15]; the Gittins allocation
index [3, 4], also known as dynamic allocation
index, which can be used in cases of reward.
Gittins index technology is proven to yield the
highest expected utility when single supplier is
available per round, but when in the background of
multi-suppliers per time, Gittins index in not
necessary optimal. Thus, we prefer Gittins index
when the single supplier situation is discussed,
however, we will employ heuristic forward
iteration algorithms when the multiple suppliers
situation is presented.
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3. Formal model with single Supplier
Consider an agent facing a market of N suppliers
who sell a given item, the quality of the item sold
by supplier i is ui , the standard deviation is σ i
and its price is pi , the agent need to buy the item
regularly at discrete time period. At each time
period, the agent must choose one supplier among
the N suppliers, he has no knowledge about the
mean quality and deviation about each supplier, but
he knows the price of each supplier, besides, the
agent maintains a history of ni length of previous
interactions with supplier i . Then the average
quality and standard deviation of supplier i is xi
and sˆi respectively. The utility of the agent
buying an item from supplier i with quality xi and
price pi is xi - pi
.
3.1 Two supplier scenario and Gittins Index
We first introduce the simplest situation in which
the agent only facing two suppliers S (safe) and R
(random). The agent has full information about safe
supplier and its quality X S , while alternative
supplier R is unknown to the agent and its quality
X R whose distribution law f on  also
unknown to the agent. We assume that the agent
has a prior on f . In a dynamic environment, the
agent may learn about the distribution law f of
the random quality X R by buying product from R
and observing realizations X R (t ) of X R at time
period t and update his prior on f after t . The
agent selects a Y (t ) ∈ {S , R} at each time period t .
Then the total utility of the agent can be formulated
in a stochastic discounted inter-temporal matter:

U (=
Y (⋅))

+∞

∑ ρ H (Φ(Y (t ), X (t + 1)))
t

(1)

0

is the discount rate,
ρ ∈ [0,1]
Φ ( S , X (t + 1)) = X S , Φ ( R, X (t + 1)) = X R (t ) .
H (⋅) is the utility function. Since we assume that
agent’s utility can be expressed by the subtraction
of quality and price, thus when supplier R is
selected, H (⋅) is X R (t ) - pR .
The above problem is a standard approach of
classical bandit problem. It’s one armed bandit
problem because the state of arm S is stationary.
The state of the other arm R fˆt is a Markov
process whose transition subject to the Bayesian
updating with respect to the observation of X R (t ) .
Gittins index is an optimal strategy for this bandit
problem. At a certain stage, the agent need to
compute index of each arm and the optimal
strategy is to select the arm with the higher index.
The state of the selected arm evolves according to a

Where

given rule, but the states of other arms remain
unchanged. Gittins index is defined as follows:

E[∑ t = 0 ρ t Φ (vt ) | v0 =
v]
τ −1

GI (v) = sup
τ >0

E[∑ t = 0 ρ t | v0 = v]
τ −1

(2)

While v0 is the initial state of a given arm, Φ (⋅) is
reward function of state vt . The index is the
maximal average reward over a stopping time of
the arm. The index value also makes the option of
continuation or retirement no differences. As in our
context, since the index of supplier S is constant,
then given GI ( S ) , GI ( R, v) and the state
v = fˆ at stage t , the optimal strategy is to select
t

t

the supplier with the higher index: supplier S if
GI ( S ) > GI ( R, fˆt ) and supplier R else.
The calculation of Gittins index by definition (2)
is difficult. Fortunately, there is a convenient
approach to compute Gittins index. Let
g ( x , sˆ, n) denotes the index value of an arm with a
history of n length, average value of x and
standard deviation ŝ , Gittins proved that [16]
(3)
g ( x , sˆˆ, n) = x + sg (0,1, n)
In (3), g (0,1, n) is the standard Gittins index with
mean value 0, standard deviation 1, and history
length n . Gittins calculated g (0,1, n) given
different combinations of discount rate and n . This
show that multiplying the standard index value by
the deviation of the arm’s reward and adding the
average reward of the arm forms the index value of
the arm. It can be observed that as an arm’s average
rewards increases, its index value increases too.
The standard deviation and the history length also
play important roles in the index calculation. Since
the standard Gittins index is only significant when
n is small ( n <10), when n is getting larger
g (0,1, n) becoming small drastically. Thus
ˆ (0,1, n) shows that the contribution of the
sg
standard deviation of an arm to the index value
decreases greatly when its history length increases.
It can be explained as follows: when the experience
to an arm is low (history length is small) it is better
to select arm with highly risky (higher standard
deviation), because the risky arm might generate
high rewards in the future. However, as the
experience of an arm is long enough, then the
average rewards will take dominance in the
calculation of the index value. The theory behind it
is that the law of larger numbers ensures that when
history length is long enough the average rewards
is extremely close to its mean rewards.
Proposition 1. Consider two agents with common
prior belief f 0 , and one agent is more risk averse
than the other. If at the beginning, the more
risk-averse agent selects supplier R based on f 0 ,
then the less risk-averse agent will select R too.
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And as long as the more risk-averse agent selects
supplier R, so does the less risk-averse agent.
The proposition is proved by Chancelier[17], it
implies that the agents can be ranked by their
degree of risk aversion. Based on proposition 1,
we have direct corollary 1 and corollary 2.
Corollary 1. If the less risk-averse agent selects
supplier S based on f 0 , so does the more
risk-averse agent, and as long as the less
risk-averse agent selects supplier S, so does the
more risk-averse agent.
Corollary 2. The number of times agent select
supplier R is a decreasing function of the degree of
its risk-aversion.
Proposition 2. An agent selects the safe supplier if
and only if the index value of random supplier R
less than the index value of safe supplier S, and
once an agent selects the safe supplier, he would
stick to the safe supplier forever.
Proof. The first assertion is the major result of
optimal strategies for bandit problems. That is
choose the higher index at every stage. If the agent
selects the safe supplier, thus the state of the
random supplier remains fixed. Then the index
value of supplier S will always larger than supplier
R at the future stages, therefore, the agent shall
select safe supplier all the time.
3.2 Multiple Suppliers Scenario
Problem Statement: an agent wants to buy an item
from N suppliers repeatedly, but he has no
knowledge about the quality of each suppliers. The
agent’s object is to maximize his utility.
Proposition 3. Given the price pi of supplier i
and remains as a constant, then the calculation of
Gittins index is as follows:
(4)
g ( xi , sˆˆi , ni ) = xi + si g (0,1, ni ) − pi
Proof. Since the price pi is a constant over time,
it will not influence sˆi on the whole. As we
assume above, the utility of the agent can be
expressed as the subtraction of quality and price,
then the price pi just decreases the agent’s utility
from select supplier i . Actually, the Gittins index
can be divided into two parts: exploitation and
exploration where xi is the part of exploitation
and sˆi g (0,1, ni ) is the part of exploration. The
constant pi doesn’t influence the exploration part,
let the exploitation part be xi - pi , then the
structure of Gittins index is maintained. ∎
The proposition makes sure that the agent only
pays more for higher quality. This does accord with
economic sense.
Based on the proposition 3, the optimal strategy for
the agent is straight. The steps are as follows:
Step 1: at every stage t , compute Gittins
index of every supplier g ( xi , sˆi , ni ) according to
(4).

Step 2: select supplier j with the largest
Gittins index value, that is
j = arg max g ( xi , sˆi , ni )
i

Step 3: choose supplier j and, buy product
from j , observe the quality of the product
and update parameters as follows:
n j x j + x j (n j + 1)
(1) x j =
nj +1
(2) sˆ j
=

1
nj

n j +1

∑ ( x (k ) − x )
k =1

j

2

j

(3) n=
nj +1
j
Step 4: move on to the next time period and
repeat step 1 to step 3.
There is an important issue to use the Gittins index
in the above strategy. The standard Gittins index
g (0,1, ni ) requires a history length ni at least
larger than 2, i.e. the agent must buy product from
each supplier at least two times first. If there are
too many suppliers in the market, then the agent
must spend a lot of opportunities in order to meet
the requirement of 2 history length. In this situation,
the agent faces double bandit processes. At each
time period, the agent needs to select supplier from
the suppliers with history length larger than 2 or
select new supplier with no history. In order to
cope with the new supplier issue, the agent must
balance the trade-off select old suppliers or new
suppliers. Though there is not optimal strategy for
the new supplier issue, the agent can employ a
heuristic to solve it: at the initial stages, when all
suppliers are new, the agent needs to explore new
suppliers aggressively, as the agent has a lot of old
suppliers, he might want to look at the old suppliers
more often, thus he can employ a greedy algorithm
to decide which group of supplier to select. The
process is: set up a probability w , with probability
w choose supplier from old supplier group and
with probability 1- w from new group. When the
group of old supplier is big enough, then the agent
needs to gradually increase w so as to make sure
the agent can take advantage of exploitation
sufficiently for the sake of utility maximization.

4 Choosing K-Suppliers Problem
Section 3 discusses the issue of how to select a
single supplier per stage and provide optimal
strategies by using Gittins index technology.
Choose a single supplier per stage is suitable for
small businesses, but as for big corporation, for the
sake of diminish risk, they might want to buy
product from different supplier, or at each time
period, the agent want to select k-suppliers from all
the supplier pool.
Problem statement: an agent wants to buy items
from N suppliers repeatedly, at every stage, he
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shall select k-suppliers, but he has no knowledge
about the quality of each suppliers. The agent’s
object is to maximize his utility.
The problem of selecting k-suppliers can be
modeled as multi-armed bandit problem with
multiple plays, i.e. the gambler can pull multiple
slots at each time period. Though there are a lot
concerns about the MABMP problem, the optimal
solution is still not ready. In this section, we
provide several heuristic algorithms for it and by
constructing a simulation platform we evaluate
these algorithms in different settings.
The first algorithm is based on Gittins index. Since
Gittins index is optimal for single supplier scenario,
we believe the index value is a good heuristic
information for each supplier. The process is as
follows:
Step 1. Select each supplier two times by any
order;
Step 2. Compute Gittins index for every
supplier according to equation (4);
Step 3. Select k suppliers with the k-highest
Gittins index;
Step 4. Buy product from these k suppliers,
observe their quality and update
parameters as follows:
For j=1 to k
n j x j + x j (n j + 1)
(1) x j =
nj +1
(2) sˆ j
=

1
nj

n j +1

∑ ( x (k ) − x )
k =1

j

2

j

(3) n=
nj +1
j
End for
Step5. move on to the next time period and
repeat step 3 and 4.
The
second
heuristic
algorithm is
straightforward. We call it uniform play and
empirical best (UPEB). The process is as follows:
Step 1. Fix up a positive integer M ;
Step 2. Select each supplier M times at any
order;
Step 3. Compute the utility of each supplier
Step 4. Always select the k-highest utility
suppliers for the future time period.
The third heuristic algorithm is interval estimation
strategy (IES). IES strategy choose suppliers by
estimate their upper quality bound and choose the
k-highest upper quality bound suppliers at every
time period. The process is as follows:
Step 1. Set up a quantile a ;
Step 2. Select each supplier two times at any
order.
Step 3. For i = 1 to N
Compte the upper bound of each supplier
as (5)
studentα 2 (1)
(5)
− pi
upperi ,α =
xi + sˆi
2

End for ( studentα 2 (1) denotes the student

Step

4.

distribution function with
freedom 1 and
quantile
a/2)
Select the k-highest upperi ,α

suppliers
Step 5. Buy product from the suppliers at step
4, observe their quality and update
related parameters:
For j=1 to k
n=
nj +1
j

=
xj

=
sˆ j

n j −1
nj

xj +

1
x j (n j )
nj

n
2
1  j
 ∑ ( x j (i ) − x j ) 
n j − 1  i =1


upperj ,α= x j + σˆ j

studentα 2 (n j − 1)
nj

- pj

End for
Step 6. Repeat step 4 and step 5.
The reason we use student distribution to compute
the upper bound is that, when we have no
knowledge about the mean value and variance, the
normal distribution is the most common used
distribution to represent it.
The last heuristic policy is called stepwise
T-checked policy (STP), this policy also uses the
student distribution, and the process is as follows:
Step 1. Set up a quantile a , a positive integer
B
Step 2. Select all suppliers two times at any
order;
Step 3. Compute the utility of every supplier
based on the two samples.
Step 4. Select the k-highest utility suppliers
For the B lowest utility suppliers in the
k-highest suppliers i
For other suppliers not in the k-highest
suppliers j
Let stat=

x j − xi
sˆ j

nj

If stat< − studentα (n j − 1)
Then substitute supplier i with
supplier j
End for
End for
Step 5. Buy product from the revised
k-suppliers, and then update their
mean quality and standard deviation.
Step 6. Repeat step 4 and step 5.
In order to test the performance of these four
heuristic strategies, we build up a simulation
platform with different settings. In our simulation,
we defined several agents which behave
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according to the strategies above. The quality of
the products produced by each supplier is derived
from a normal distribution, but the details of this
distribution are unknown to the agents. The mean
quality and price of each supplier is drawn
randomly from the interval [20,140] in all runs,
and the standard deviation is drawn randomly
from the interval [40,100].
In our first simulation, the size of suppliers is 40,
and the agent can choose 10 suppliers
simultaneously at every time period. We let the
horizon be 200, and run the simulation 10000 times.
The result is presented in table 1.
Table 1 simulation results with 40 suppliers
and 10 available per period with 200 horizons
UPEB1, UPEB2, UPEB3, UPEB4 and UPEB5
are the agents of UPEB with the value of
M 5,8,10 and15 respectively. STP1, STP2 and
Agent
Total
utility
Agent
Total
utility

UPEB
1

UPEB
2

UPEB
3

UPEB
4

UPEB5

77201

77542

75626

67801

58352

GIH

IEP

STP1

STP2

STP3

90347

91467

91291

91552

91422

STP3 are the agents of STP policy with the value
of B 2, 3 and 4 respectively. GIH is the policy
based on Gittins index. The result shows that all
UPEB-based policies are strictly worse than other
policies. Among the five UPEB policies, UPEB2
whose sample time is suitable achieve the best
utility. Since small sample times lead to
under-exploration, large sample times lead to
over-exploration. Indeed, Gittins index is good
heuristic information, though it doesn’t achieve the
best value. The outputs of IEP and STP are very
close, and STP2 is the best strategy over all. The
reason is similar with UPEB.
We extend the total horizon to 300 periods. We
find that the STP2 is the best strategy also. The
total utility of all agents is double than 200 periods,
that’s because during the first 200 periods, the
agents spend a lot of periods on exploration.
Let the size of supplier is 60 and other settings are
the same as the first simulation, the result is
showed in table 2.
The results are similar with table1, but the best
strategy is IEP. The reason might be as the size of
supplier increases, the upper bound policy can find
more high quality suppliers with low price.
The three simulations show that the agent
should employ IEP or STP strategy since they
can yield the best utility. When the size of
supplier is relatively small, the agent should
favor STP strategy, and when the size of supplier
is relatively large, the agent should favor IEP
strategy.

Table 2 simulation results with 60 suppliers and
10 available per period with 200 horizons
Agent
Total
utility
Agent
Total
utility

UPEB1

UPEB2

UPEB3

UPEB4

UPEB5

96137

92145

86898

71328

53122

GIH

IEP

STP1

STP2

STP3

110079

113984

111271

111306

110890

5. Conclusion
In this research, we discuss the issue of select
suppliers from e-market with incomplete
information. We show that the problem can be
modeled by the multi-armed bandit problem. We
first consider the simplest scenario where there are
only two suppliers in the market and the agent has
full information of safe supplier, then we show how
to solve it by the technology of Gittins index and
the impact of risk-aversion. Besides, we show that
Gittins index is also optimal when there are several
suppliers.
We also consider the situation when an agent can
choose multiple suppliers simultaneously at each
time period. We provide four heuristic policies to
solve the trade-off of exploitation and exploration
issue of multiple suppliers’ selection problem. In
order to test the performance of different policy, we
develop a simulation tool and shows that the agent
should favor STP policy when the size of supplier
is relatively small and IEP policy otherwise.
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